

PHOBOS

Nr. 289, onsdag 11. juli 2001

REDAKSJONELT

ARCON er over.

Dette kommer neppe som noen overraskelse på det hverende organs lesere, men vi føler likevel at det er på sin plass å fastslå det, heller enn å jabbe videre sommerværet, slik vi ellers gjerne har for vane. Ikke for det, vi har blitt varme, og våte, og i det hele tatt opplevd en klassisk norsk sommer, vi óg, men nå var jo meningen da å skrive om ARCON.

Årets utgave later til å ha vært relativt vellykket, vi har i et hvert fall ikke fått med oss noen store klagepunkter på årets utgave, verken i det ene, eller det andre fora. (men hvis noen av leserne skulle ha et tips om hvordan ARCON kan bli enda bedre, så er ikke vi så overbevist om egen fortrefelighet at vi ikke er villige til å lytte. Tvert i mot, i et håp om å få litt respons på årets arrangement ligger det et feedbackskjema vedlagt dette nummer av Phobos.)

Multicon 2

Vi går ut i fra at alle som leser det hverende organ er påmeldt til Multicon allerede, men vi benytter likevel sjansen til å minne om at betalingsfristen løper ut nå til helgen - meld dere på årest store SF-arrangement før prisen stiger.

Multicon er et samarbeidsprosjekt mellom TSP/Shadowcon og Aniara/Intercon/Norcon.

Formålet med samarbeidet er å skape en festival som har et bredere programtilbud til deltagerne enn vi klarer å lage hver for oss. Dette bredere programtilbudet inkluderer bl.a. et spillprogram, som vi håper vil være av interesse for klubbens medlemmer.

Kongressen finner sted på Blindern, fra 2. til 5. august i år, det er bare tre uker igjen til kongressen når dette bladet kommer ut.

Hvis du ønsker å vite mer om Multicon er du velkommen til å spørre Herman eller Johannes om informasjon, eller se websidene: www.shadowproject.org.

EX CATHEDRA #189

Spalten til *Johannes H. Berg* (formann Ares/Bjølsten, administrator for Arcon)

Ja, nå har vi endelig begynt å få hodet litt over vannet igjen i forbindelse med at ARCON-feberen har fortatt seg en smule. Vi synbes fortsatt det hele gikk rimelig bra, men likevel: Det er ikke alltid at man kommer til samme konklusjoner med noen ukers ettertanke bak seg, som **rett** etter et evenement som unektelig er noe av en kraftutfoldelse for de som er involvert. Lettelsen over at det endelig var slutt på tilbakegangen i antall medlemmer, medførte nok at vi tok i litt for entusiastisk når vi estimerte totalantallet, og det ser nå ut til at vi bare endte med omtrent 600 deltagere – fortsatt en pen vekst, men kanskje ikke på over 10%. En av usikkerhetsfaktorene her er at fjorårets fremmøte er litt mer usikkert enn vi trodde, men det ser for så vidt ut til at ca. 550 i 200 og 600 i 2001 er brukelige tall.

Vi skal jobbe litt mer med dette, bl.a. fordi det i ARCON-sammenheng er interessant å kunne studere tallene litt over tid, samt å sammenligne trender og tendenser i statistikken for å kunne gjøre noe med dem. Det er for eksempel interessant at vi hvert år har en stor mengde nye interesserte (kanskje så mange som 25-30% hver gang!); en av måtene å skaffe seg flere deltagere på, blir jo da å studere forskjellige måter vi kan gå frem for å få «repeat customers». Aller helst ville vi selvsagt at ARCON skal bli så vanedannende at ingen slutter å komme, men i så fall hadde vi nok allerede hatt et alvorlig plassproblem (:det må har vært minst en 3-4000 mennesker innom i løpet av de årene vi har holdt på, viser et enkelt «back-of-the-envelope»-type overslag, dersom andelen helt nye hele tiden har ligget på ca. 25-30%).

Det er ikke så lenge til et nytt, seriøst forsøk på å arrangere *Tidenes Beste ARCON* skal påbegynnes. Ja, for det er ingen grunn til å gå til verket med noe mindre enn den

innsatsviljen som skal til for å overgå det meste som tidligere har vært gjort. Selvsagt er det ikke realistisk å doble medlemstallet i løpet av ett år – men vi snakker kvalitet, ikke kvantitet nå! «Tidenes Beste ARCON» kan godt ha vært ARCON 5, den siste av de to på Nordkanten Samfunnshus (1989) – i den grad man kan vurdere noe slikt i det hele tatt, var det i hvert fall en kongress med en usedvanlig god stemning, selv om den utvilsomt kvalifiserte til betegnelsen «**Trangeste ARCON** noensinne»! Og for de av dere som er sykkelig opptatt av fremmøtet, så var det dengang man kunne observere en tilvekst på 60% til året etterpå (fra 330 til 500 deltagere). For det er selvfølgelig umulig å si om økningen på ARCON 17, for eksempel, kom av at det var så mange som likte seg svært godt på ARCON:2000!

Med andre ord – statistikk er ikke alt; vi har også feedback-skjemaer, og siden de foreligger nå, hadde det vært en fordel om dere kunne bruke dem! Eksemplarer skal være vedlagt dette nr. av PHOBOS, og ellers har vi en nettversjon tilgjengelig på våre hjemmesider, www.fandom.no/arcon...

Johannes H. Berg

NESTE OSLO SPILLFORUM er ført opp på søndag 19. august

Dersom du er interessert i å komme, best du forhåndspåmelde deg til chefsarrangør Johannes H. Berg, enten via hans utmerkede telefoner (22 14 11 20, 22 14 41 63, 22 79 60 00 eller 92 08 13 65, for å nevne noen få), eller på mail: jhberg@fandom.no eller johannes.berg@norsk-teknisk.museum.no (NB: med bindestrek)

Resultatservice - ARCON 17

Rollespill

Ars Magica

Beste Lag:
Nicolai Eckhoff
Geir Atle Hegsvold
Lars Madzen
Øystein Johansen
Sveinn Sandvik Svendsen
Roar Granerud
Beste GM:
Dag Vestberg

Call of Chtulhu

Beste Lag:
Øystein Johansen
Øystein Høgset
Sverre Midthjell
Sven Trygve Haabeth
Erlend Berg-Johannes
Beste GM'er (delt førsteplass):
Geir Amdal
Kjell Windsland

D & D Duell

1 Hans Arne Toverud Georgsen
2 Thomas Refsdal
3 Lasse Wold

D&D NM

Beste Spiller:
1 Trond Saksvik
2 Øystein Høgset
3 Geir Amdal
Beste GM:
Sven Trygve Haavedt

Fabula

Beste Spiller:
1 Kent Jensen (Gim)
2 Hanne Grasmø
2 Michael Esperum

Feng Shui

Beste Lag:
Jan Erik Hagen
Karl Andre Skevik
Martin Dahl
Sverre Midthjell
Edvard Christiansen
Beste GM:
Torgim Husvik

GURPS Discworld

Beste Spiller:
Jo Herman
Thor Erik Skane
Erik Nogra
Beste GM:
Martin Bull Gudmundsen

GURPS: Wheel of Time

Beste Lag:
Jon Tangvold
Erlend Bruer
Martin Rossing
Ole Marcus Merø
Øivind Lyngaas
Beste GM:
Christopher Neumann Ruud

Hackmaster

1 Bengt Olav Olsen
2 Thomas Herlofsen
3 Nina Ophus

Paranoia

Beste Spiller:
1 Kenneth Solvang
2 Øystein H Johnson
3 Lars Gunnar Lian
Beste GM:
Katrine Myra

Spilledermesterskapet

Sindre Flatland

Terrorist

Beste Spiller:
1 Cornelius Henriksen
2 Mads Petter Johnsen
3 John H. Seklesten
Beste GM:
Tron Ljødal

Vampire the Masquerade

Beste Lag:
Øivind Lyngaas
Christopher Neumann Ruud
Martin Rossing
Elin Sjølie
Linn Hattestrand
Beste GM:
Kristoffer Blystad

Werewolf

Beste Lag:
Cornelius Henriksen
Tor Erik Skane
Kari Anne Grønsæter
Bodil Manso
Ragnar Oppedal
Beste GM:
Kristoffer Blystad

Brettspill

1830

1 Ståle Halvorsen
2 Rolf Beikevold
3 Jan Åge Eriksen
4 Bjørn Erik Bugge
5 Jan Erik Storebø

A House Divided

Nybegynnerklassen:
1 Ketil Balle
2 Hillmar A Lysgård
Videregåendeklassen
1 Stein Hugo Hiller

Age of Renaissance

1 Lars Heggland
2 Harald Midthjell
3 Dag Øverbakke

Axis and Allies Individuell

1 Trond Arild Elvan (Tyskland)
2 Ketil Balle (Japan)
3 Robert Ian Olsen (USA)

Axis and Allies Lag

Beste Lag:
Johnny Bredesen
Tom Gulbrandsen

Battle for Moscow

Bolsjevik Serien
1 Tore Stuedahl
2 Jan Einar Tamber
3 Pål Ophaug
Mensjevik Serien
1 Ulrik Bøe
2 Sten Hugo Hiller
3 Tron Ljødal
3 Bjørn Ove Olafsen

Diplomacy

- 1 Sigurd Eskeland
- 2 Fredrik Ørlyng
- 3 Erik Feiring
- 4 Hawdi Sæther
- 5 Atle Kjøsen
- 6 Håvard Njå
- 7 Erik Nilsen Haga
- 8 Ottar Birkeland
- 9 Roger Strand
- 10 Eirik Ovrum

Euphrat og Tigris

- 1 Harald Torvatn
- 2 Hilde Austlid
- 3 Per Johan Lysberg

Advanced Civilization

- 1 Øystein Arnesen
- 2 Lars Heggland
- 3 Hans Petter Evju
- 4 Rune Fagermo
- 5 Trond Ljødal
- 6 Tore Heggnes
- 7 Espen Larsen
- 8 Sten Hugo Hiller

Formula Dé

- 1 Ståle Halvorsen
- 2 Torgeir Johansen
- 3 Dag Øverbakke

History of the World

- 1 Kjetil Netland
- 2 Håvard Larsen
- 3 Arnt Olav Foseide
- 4 Allen Moen
- 5 Kenneth Krulheim
- 6 Jan Erik Storebø

Junta

- 1 Theo Bruknapp
- 2 Magnus Grøndahl
- 2 Eirik Ovrum
- 4 Pål Vasdal
- 5 Jakob Libak
- 6 Øyvind Krusedokken
- 7 Sverre Midthjell

Kremlin

- 1 Piet Skjæveland
- 2 Sten Hugo Hiller
- 3 Eirik Prichard

RISK

- 1 Tord Ingolf Reistad
- 2 Rasmus Jahr
- 3 Kristoffer Rees

Roborally

- 1 Haakon Monsen
- 2 Håkon Erikson
- 3 Daniel Aasberg

Settlers of Catan

- Ingebrigt Berg
Glenn Hansen
Bjørn-Erik Bygge

Titan

- 1 Dag Øverbakke
- 2 Bjørn Erik Bugge

Minatyrspill**Blood Bowl**

- 1 Pål Vasdal
- 2 Leiv Hodne

Warhammer 40000

- 1 Are Riksaasen
- 2 Lasse Haug
- 3 Ulrik Bøe

Warhammer Fantasy Battle

- 1 Ottar Becker
- 2 Tarje Nattestad
- 3 Jostein Nejheim

Kortspill**Babylon 5 CCG NM**

- 1 Tommy Thordarson
- 2 Jan Morten
- 3 Rune Aaboen

Magic the Gathering Draft**Draft 1:**

- 1 Thomas Refsdal
- 2 Håkon Monsen
- 3 Geir Bakke

Draft 2:

- 1 Nicolai Herzog
- 2 Eivind Benneche
- 3 Geir Bakke

Draft 3:

- 1 Nicolai Herzog
- 2 Geir Bakke
- 3 Nikolas Nygaard

Magic the Gathering Sealed Deck

- 1 Tor Erling Bjørnstad
- 2 Erik Kindlien
- 3 Nicolai Herzog

Magic the Gathering Standard

- 1 Nicolai Herzog
- 2 Nikolas Nygaard
- 3 Arne Gunnar Bakke
- 4 Geir Bakke

Poker

- 1 Sigurd Eskeland
- 2 Egil Nygård

Wrasslin Tag Team

- 1 Ronny Tømmerbakk

Kostymekonkurranse

- Beste Fantasy (mann)
Andre Øvre
Beste Fantasy (kvinne)
Johanne Seeland
Beste Gothic/Vampire
Ingrid Windsland

PHOBOS

Medlemsblad for Ares —
forening for simuleringsspill

Redaksjon:

Johannes H. Berg,
Herman Ellingsen, Trond
Jansen

Utkommer til hver 2. og hver
4. onsdag i måneden
(unntatt desember, da vi
hopper over romjulen...)

The Dragon Breaks Its Sleep:

Events leading to China's War of Resistance

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Introduction

This is an overview of events to provide a backdrop for the 1937 initiation of open warfare between China and Japan. The domestic factors of China's disunity and Japan's social contradictions are examined as leading causes for that open warfare. Japan's social contradictions, evidenced by a civilian government dominated by military vetoes and assassinations, hungered for a simplistic resolution through battle glory and conquest. China's disunity, evidenced by the inability of its fledgling Central government to control independent regional military forces, encouraged Japan's aggression.

An understanding of these events is crucial to a complete comprehension of the context in which China fought her War of Resistance, and to gain a full appreciation of China's contribution to the global World War II effort. Early in the war, American leaders hoped that China might provide the manpower and blood to actively defeat Japan with minimal Western intervention. However, this hope was eventually abandoned as frustrated American leaders realized the gravity of China's problems. China's political corruption, military ineptitude, and lack of national unity could not be ignored. However, while China's weaknesses prevented her full military contribution towards the destruction of the Japanese war machine, they should also enhance appreciation for China's underrated contribution towards Allied victory. Ultimately, China's weaknesses also help explain China's desperate determination to out-bleed Japan. China tied down more than 1 million Japanese troops who could have fought the United States and other Allies. China's blood sacrifice enabled her Allies to defeat Japan at an incalculably lower cost in lives and treasure. The benefit to China's allies came through China's pre-existing desperate traits. One of the most significant causes which forced China to its desperate sacrifice for Allied civilization was China's advent of warlordism.

China's warlordism is generally considered to have lasted from 1916-1928. It could be considered merely another version of feudalism or regionalism. Nonetheless, warlordism had sweeping political and military effects on China throughout the Sino-Japanese Conflict. Warlordism survived under a veneer of centralized Chinese government. Warlordism was also the crucible from which emerged China's principal revolutionary movements, such as the Chinese Kuomintang (Nationalist Party or KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Traces of warlord regionalism persist even to the present, with at least two reported modern incidents of insubordination by regional military commanders, and a regionally fractured organization of the Chinese military structure, with jealously competing bureaucracies.

Roots of Disunity

The roots of the fractured Chinese military at the advent of the Sino-Japanese Conflict extend back centuries into Chinese history.

Extremely poor communication networks, a variety of ethnic nuclei and the diversity of language and culture, have always stimulated a latent regionalism in China. Regionalism tended to remain dormant in the face of strong central authority while periodically resurfacing during periods of weak central government.

During the early 1800's, the two-century old Manchu (*Ch'ing*) Dynasty was suffering from just such a weak central government. Beset by foreign economic and territorial encroachment, the infiltration of western ideas, and a military organization enfeebled by inactivity and decentralization; Manchu power, prestige and treasury were in decline. Furthermore, Manchu institutions, being of Manchurian heritage, were themselves considered foreign and could not tap into Chinese nationalism to resist further foreign encroachment. Regional rebellions sprang up throughout the empire. Since the central government was no longer capable of dealing with the uprisings, local defense forces formed. The Manchu government could do little to stop the formation of these forces beyond supporting those that appeared to have interests most nearly coinciding with that of the Court at Peking. By the 1850s, the religiously motivated Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) had stirred a wave of revolution throughout central China.

To face the challenge, the Manchus corralled various local forces into regional armies under the command of members of the gentry who were considered loyal to the Manchu Court. These new regional armies were formed from ethnically and regionally homogeneous recruits of the provinces. While these armies exerted virtually autonomous military control over the region in which they were recruited, they did not challenge the political authority of the Manchu Dynasty. Their commanders viewed the Manchu Court as upholding the traditional Chinese Confucian social order that supported the commanders' gentry interests. The Manchu government gave the commanders the responsibility to recruit both existing local forces and new soldiers into the regional armies. As a result, regional armies



were founded on a principle of personal loyalties. A commander would recruit subordinates loyal to him, the subordinates doing the same, and so on down the chain of command. Each level of military unit was loyal to no one other than the leader to whom they directly reported. The regional armies ranged widely in size, modernity and discipline; but were personal armies.

The first army of this type, and the one that set the pattern, was the Hunan Army, organized in 1853. Others followed including the Anhwei Army, the largest regional army of the period. The regional armies, with foreign support of supplies and military hardware, quelled the Taiping rebellion but did not subsequently disband. Instead, they became the only effective domestic military organizations in China and were the military manifestations of the growth of regional power. To pay for the sustenance of the regional armies, commanders sought control over local sources of revenue which the central government, realizing its dependence upon these armies, increasingly gave. Control over local revenues became a way for military leaders to infiltrate local politics. The balance between central and regional power became permanently altered and would not shift back authoritatively towards centralization until the Communist ascendancy in 1949.

While the provinces of this early period assumed a more autonomous posture, maintaining their own armies and governments with local taxation, their leaders generally had no aspirations towards independence. They were civil officers who viewed the Manchu order, support for Confucian social ideals, and anti-Westernism, as essentially synonymous with their own interests. But by the turn of the century, the interests of the central government and the regional provinces increasingly diverged. The existence of regional governments whose power base was intermingled with military organizations allowed new, military-oriented men to rise to power. These were men who were indoctrinated into their regional armies with personal loyalties to the local commanders rather than to the dynasty. The Manchu rulers repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to re-acquire the central power base that they had once enjoyed.

By the time of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, regional divergence was dangerously entrenched. Regionalism was such a significant cause of Chinese defeat in that war that it was said that a single province, Chihli (later called Hopei), was fighting all of Japan. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, while imperial troops fought against foreigners around Peking, regional warlords remained aloof and disinterested, preferring instead to observe separate agreements held with the foreign powers.

These military fiascoes convinced the Manchu Court that a modernization program must be undertaken. The Court approached Yüan Shih-k'ai, a protégé of the Anhwei Army, and accepted his proposal of a German-style army. In 1895 Yüan was given command of 5,000 troops to begin the program. This army ultimately grew into the Peiyang Army, which by 1905 was the most formidable force in China, with up to 80,000 troops trained and equipped in the western style. However, the Peiyang Army's rise also meant that Yüan became a military threat, and as such he acquired enemies in the Manchu Court. Yüan was officially eased out of the Peiyang Army's command in the power shuffle following the death of the Empress Dowager in 1908.

However, the Peiyang Army remained essentially Yüan's personal army and Yüan lost little effective control. By 1911, personal regional armies comprised almost all of China's

domestic military forces, and Yüan's Peiyang Army was the largest and most powerful. The regional armies ranged widely in character from large to small, modern to primitive, disciplined to ragged; but all displayed the character of personal armies.

Yüan was the first of the regional military men to suffer political setbacks, and thus was the first to be truly tempted to use his military power towards anti-dynastic ends. He was a man of military character, without true Confucian social ideals nor genuine interest in the perpetuation of Manchu rule. In addition, foreign encroachment on Chinese culture and society was introducing western ideas that were unraveling Chinese tradition from within. Military men like Yüan were not outcasts, but riders of a new wave of nationalism that at once embraced foreign concepts while being fundamentally anti-foreign. Such anti-foreign sentiment was often devoid of progressive elements. For instance, a popular slogan was "to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty and restore the Ming Dynasty," merely substituting a foreign monarchy for a domestic monarchy. Nonetheless, the Manchu Dynasty was seen in terms of their foreign heritage and foreign appeasement, and thus became the focus of anti-foreign sentiment. Political power continued to drain from the centralized Manchu government to the regional military men. By 1911, these officers' only real commitment was to personal advancement by military means. This blossoming of true warlordism arose from the seeds sown during the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s. Warlordism's full flowering awaited the death of Manchu rule.

The Republic, Stillborn

In October of 1911, when revolutionary plotters were prematurely discovered in Hankow, they realized that further delay meant capture and death. The revolutionaries quickly seized local control and were surprised by the lack of Manchu resistance. Rebellions erupted throughout urban China. Within a month, nine provinces had declared their independence from the Manchu Dynasty, though not necessarily in favor of the revolutionary movement. Manchu control, weakened as it was, began to unravel. The retired Yüan, seen as the Manchus' only hope, was desperately reinstated as commander of the Peiyang Army and sent forth to quell the rebellion. After recapturing a number of rebel strongholds, Yüan, having no particular allegiance to the Manchu Court, began to negotiate with the rebel leaders in an effort to form a constitutional monarchy with himself as leader. At the same time, the Manchu Court offered Yüan the job of premier. Yüan was sought for leadership by both sides of the conflict. Yüan chose the post at the Manchu Court and gained control of Peking.

Meanwhile, the rebels captured the former Chinese capital, Nanking, by December 1911. The Chinese revolutionary leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, returned to China after years in exile while raising support for revolution. Delegates from 16 provincial assemblies immediately elected him as president. The defection of a host of senior Peiyang Army commanders spelled doom for the Manchu Dynasty. In February 1912, the last Manchu emperor, Aisin-Gioro Pu-yi, four years old, abdicated with orders to Premier Yüan to organize a republican government. Yüan remained in control of north China from Peking. Dr. Sun remained south in Nanking. Since neither side was strong enough to dominate the other, Dr. Sun, in the interest of national unity, resigned the presidency to Yüan in March 1912. Thus, Yüan Shih-k'ai emerged from the 1911 revolution as China's

most powerful man, being both legal head of state and military commander of the formidable Peiyang Army.

China remained relatively unified until Yüan's death in 1916, but signs of anarchy were already apparent. Yüan's unilateral bid in 1915 to set himself up as emperor of a new dynasty failed miserably. Yüan repeatedly resorted to military force to restore domestic order and to enforce his presidential decrees, thereby undermining the civilian government and strengthening military influence. Republicans and other regional leaders, too politically weak to counter Yüan, also became dependent on military solutions. Warlordism grew unchallenged. Yüan's authority was also undermined by his weak response to Japan's Twenty-One Demands, which if accepted would have turned China into a Japanese protectorate. Japan had attempted to expand at China's expense while World War I distracted the western powers. However, popular demonstrations broke out and other warlords denounced the Demands. Chinese nationalist fervor defeated Japan's plans and discredited Yüan. Despite the illusion of unity during Yüan's reign, his ultimate legacy would be one of anarchy.

The Warlords

With Yüan's passing, the Peiyang Army lost its cohesion and broke down into constituent components, each having loyalty only to its own commander. The components' individual military strengths were lowered to the order of various other military organizations throughout China. Thus began the true period of warlordism, characterized by a decade of constant strife and shifting military and political power. Peking remained the coveted prize in the north because Peking held a claim of national leadership. From political inertia, foreign powers tended to negotiate with whichever warlord controlled Peking as if the warlord represented all of China. However, control of Peking was determined by incessant petty wars and ever-changing alliances between northern warlords. From 1916 to 1926 there were six heads of state, one brief imperial restoration, three periods of regency government, and 25 cabinets. The warlords, even while operating behind altruistic and patriotic slogans, were fundamentally motivated by the personal accumulation of wealth and power. None truly represented any significant segment of political thought or national interest. They ran the gamut from benevolence to cruelty, from grand aspirations to banal local interest.

The major warlords were those whose accumulated military power allowed them to control a provincial capital. These warlords are generally depicted as governing that province, but the situation was in fact far less clear. Always there were lesser warlords who controlled smaller portions of the provincial periphery, a few counties or even as small as a few villages. These lesser warlords always maintained a tenuous relationship with the major warlord in the provincial capital. The major warlord could dominate any single or group of minor warlords, but the plethora of them precluded him from ever gaining true control throughout the province.

Further down the ladder roving the countryside were bandit gangs who were nearly indistinguishable from the warlords. Essentially, a warlord controlled a relatively fixed territory (although the boundaries of that territory were in constant flux) and had the trappings of legal government while a bandit gang did not. Often bandits gained the power to become warlords while ousted warlords and their personal armies became bandits. To the peasant, the distinction was arbitrary. Oppressive taxation

and dictatorial plunder were hardly distinguishable from bandit raids.

Against this tangled backdrop emerged a number of profound political movements including a resurgent nationalist *Kuomintang* and the Chinese Communist Party. Ironically, the fledgling Chinese industrial base flourished, still tiny by western standards, but larger than it had ever been in China. This growth came not from domestic reasons but because World War I had reduced global competition. A new breed of industrialists arose in China, along with a working class of urban labor. With the end of the Manchus and dynastic rule, many traditional Chinese institutions had been swept away. The Chinese people became rootless and resented foreigners for their part in the uprooting. In the moral and philosophical vacuum, Western ideas came into vogue despite deep anti-foreign sentiment that insured an incomplete understanding of the new foreign concepts. China was changing at a pace beyond control.

The rising tide of Chinese nationalistic anti-foreignism began to emerge at grass roots levels and discovered a sharp new focus on Japan. Japan's World War I acquisition of German concessions in China, particularly Shantung province, and the West's acknowledgment of Japan's claim at Versailles, peaked anti-foreign sentiment and was viewed as a betrayal by the West. Despite the fact that the Peking delegates refused to sign the Versailles treaty, the repercussions of China's humiliation sparked the 1919 May 4th Movement in Peking. Thousands of students marched in protest and forced the cabinet's resignation. Anti-Japanese feeling spread to other sectors, including labor unions and merchants and eventually evolved into a boycott of Japanese goods being sold in China.

Nationalism was embraced at many levels, most vocally by university students. The new industrialists saw a unified China as essential to the future growth of Chinese industry. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), formed in 1921 as a restless outgrowth of the May 4th Movement, wanted to unite the working classes and oust foreign interests (except those of the Soviet Union) from China. The *Kuomintang's* very name included the term nationalism and used it as a central theme in its popular growth. At times, nationalism was simply an excuse for xenophobia. Such unfocused "nationalism," with multiple and ill-defined objectives, created a veneer of common interest which papered over the fundamental unresolved hostilities between the various groups.

(fortsettes i neste nr.)

Denne føljetongen kan vi takke
Fred Førde for; den er del én
av en ganske lang artikkel fra
EUROPA MAGAZINE som kommer med
flere deler i senere nummer av
PHOBOS!

LYST TIL Å GJØRE EN INNSATS FOR ARES? INTERESSERT I ARCON?

Vil du være med på organisert arbeid med spillhobbyen?

Kunne du tenke deg å hjelpe til med

- ☐ brosjyrer
- ☐ grafisk arbeid
- ☐ kopiering/trykk av spill
- ☐ PR/verving
- ☐ spilldesign
- ☐ spillscenarioer/moduler
- ☐ spillkongresser/festivaler
- ☐ tidsskrifter
- ☐ transporttjeneste
- ☐ turneringer

eller noe som helst annet (kom med forslag!)

I så fall hører vi svært gjerne fra deg! Ta direkte kontakt med Herman Ellingsen, Johannes H. Berg eller Thomas Refsdal på spillkvelder/møter.

Eller send en mail til jhberg@fandom.no

Feedback-skjema

Hjelp oss å gjøre ARCON til en bedre festival!

Fyll ut dette skjemaet og lever det i resepsjonen før du forlater ARCON!

Du kan også sende det til følgende adresse: ARCON, Postboks 46, Blindern, 0313 Oslo, eller besøk vår webside: www.fandom.no/arcon

Blant de som leverer skjemaet trekker vi flere (1 pr 50. skjema) som vinner hvert sitt gratis medlemskap til neste ARCON. Du må gjerne sende inn anonymt. Men vil du være med i trekningen, eller du har meldt deg frivillig til ett eller annet, må du huske å ta med navn og adresse.

Personalia

Navn:	
Tlf:	
Adresse:	
Epost:	
Alder:	
Hvor mange tidligere ARCONs har du deltatt på?	

ARCON 17:

Denne delen besvares bare dersom du var på ARCON 17. Gi din vurdering av programpostene du deltok i etter følgende skala: 5-fantastisk; 4-svært bra; 3-bra; 2-noenlunde greit, men burde være bedre; 1-ikke særlig bra; 0-forferdelig, denne turneringen burde aldri vært arrangert. Gi en karakter for innhold (kvaliteten på scenario, regler, utvalg av materiale, etc.), en for gjennomføring (holde tidsskjema, gi nok informasjon, holde orden i sakene), og en for helhetsinntrykket (hvor mye du satte pris på arrangementet). Kommenter gjerne hvorfor du ga høye/lave karakterer og fortell gjerne hva som kunne vært bedre.

Programpost:	Innhold:	Gjennomføring:	Helhet:	Kommentarer:
Filmprogrammet				
Auksjonen				

Hvordan fikk du høre om ARCON 17?

Hvordan meldte du deg på? (Sett ring):

Giro

Nettbank

Mail

Stand e.l.

I døra

Andre kommentarer til ARCON 17:

ARCON 18

Kommer du på neste ARCON? ☐ JA ☐ NEI

Hvis du ikke kommer tilbake på ARCON ber vi deg skrive noen ord om hvorfor du ikke kommer tilbake. Vi vil gjerne gjøre ARCON bedre, og da er det viktig for oss å få vite hva du ikke er fornøyd med. Oppgi gjerne adresse, epost, og telefon på den andre siden av dette arket, slik at vi kan kontakte deg dersom vi skulle ønske å stille deg noen flere spørsmål.

Hvilke spill ønsker du å delta i turneringer i? Nevn, i prioritert rekkefølge, de spillene du helst vil delta i turneringer i (uansett om de har vært arrangert tidligere eller ikke).

Andre tilbud

Hvor interessert er du i nedenstående tilbud? Gi en vurdering på skalaen 1-5, der 5 er ekstremt interessant og 1 er helt uinteressant.

Programpost:	Vurd.	Programpost:	Vurd.
Film		Live roleplaying	
Auksjon		Foredrag	
Dataspill		Debatter	
Spørrekonkurranse		Workshops for spilldesign, kostymer, miniatyrer, etc	
Pub med ølservering		Utenlandsk æresgjest (kjent spilldesigner)	

Er det tilbud som ikke står på listen som du ønsker å se på ARCON 18?

Favorittgenre:

Favorittspill:

Vil du være med å arrangere ARCON 18? Oppgi i prioritert rekkefølge hvilke programposter du kunne tenke deg å arrangere, eller kryss av om du kunne tenke deg å jobbe som gopher eller i et arbeidsutvalg?

☐ Jeg kan tenke meg å jobbe som gopher.

☐ Jeg disponerer bil og kan hjelpe til med kjøring

☐ Jeg vil gjerne jobbe i arbeidsutvalg

☐ før kongressen ☐ under kongressen

Er det spesielle ting du kunne tenke deg å arbeide med?

Andre ting du ønsker å meddele ARCON-komiteen:

Jeg ønsker mer informasjon om følgende kurs:

☐ Modulskriveseminar

☐ Spillederseminar